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Professional Associations and Federal




IN the years 1942-1948, the community property system wus
adopted by state legislatures in Oregon, Nebraska, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania and was a candidate for adoption in 1\ow York and
several other eastern states. Community property mO\'cd eastward
in those days as irresistably as Rocky Mountain spotted fever, not
because the League of Women Voters wanted it or ('\'en because it
was the rediscovered heritage of .A.nglo-Americanlaw of which the
British had been brutally deprived by the Norman Conquest, as a
great scholar urged in his brief in Fernandez z.. IT'ieller.1 Not at all.
The appeal of community property to states that hud never cnjoyt"ll
the civilizing mission of a Spanish occupation emanated, simply and
solely, from the fact that it permitted husband and wife to split their
income in computing their federal income tax. As the community
property system spread, pressure mounted to throw open the privi-
lege of income-splitting to all married couples regardless of their
state's system of property law. As soon as Congress responded by
enacting the joint return provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948, how-
ever, the "new" community property states lost their taste for
Spanish law and repealed their statutes.
In the spring of 1961 a number of state legislatures enacted laws
permitting physicians and other professional persons to organize
"professional associations" or "professional corporations" for the
practice of their professions.2 If classified as "corporations" for
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1 Brief for Attorncj's General as Amici Curiae, Fernandez \', Wit:ner, 3~O t:'s.340 (1945).
Although signed by the attorncys gcncral of eight slales, lhe urief is hcadl,)' 5tuolpcd by
the scholarship of lIIax Radin who, with Joseph D. Brady and Walter L. XOSS.1lIlUn, was "of
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2 I lla\'e not been able to examine official prints of most of the lan-s, aud havo relied
largely upon copies supplied to ule by the courtcsj' of John P. Courts, of Preutice·lInll, Inc.
Statutes ha.e been enacted in the following statcs: a\rkansas (Acts of IDOl, Act 471, 2 P·ll
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federal income tax purposes, these organizations will permit physi-
cians, attorneys, and other professionals to enjoy the federal income
tax advantages of qualified pension and profit-sharing plans and
other devices open only to "employees" and, if personal holding
company status can be avoided, to shift part of their income from the
"top" of their personal returns to the "bottom" of their corporate
returns. In their abandonment of traditional prohibitions on the cor-
porate practice of medicine, law, and other professions,s the state
legislatures displayed such haste and insouciance in response to no
announced need except the reduction of federal income taxation,"
that some observers have been reminded of the 1942-1948 commu-
nity property syndrome. Will the Treasury again feel that it must
CORP. SERVo Ark. 223 (1961) (Dental Corporations); Acts of 1961, Act 179, 2 P·R CORP.
SERVo Ark. 224-A (1961) (Medieal Corporations»; Connectieut (Acts of 1961, P.A. 159,
2 P·R CoRP. SERVo Conn. 208 (1961»; Florida (Fla. La1vs 1961, R.B. 2161, 2 P·R CORP.
SERVo Fla. 229 (1961»; Georgia (Ga. Acts 1961, Act 285, 2 p.JI CoRP. SERVo Ga. 115
(1961» ; Illinois (Ill. Laws 1961, S.B. 804, 2 P-R CORP. SERVo Ill. 225 (1961»; Minnesota
(Minn. Laws 1961, ch. I (Extra Sess.), 3 P·R CORP. SERVo Minn. 555 (1961»; Ohio (Ohio
Laws 1961, S. 550, 4 P-R CORP. SERVo Ollio 441 (1961»; Oklahoma (Okla. Laws 1961,
S. 399, 4 P-R CORP. SERVo Okla. 54.67 (1961»; Pennsylvania (Pa. Laws 1961, A. 416, 4
P-R CORP. SERVo Pa. 327 (1961»; South Dakota (S.D. Laws 1961, ch. 29, 4 P·R CORP.
SERVo S.D. 87 (1961»; Tennessee (Acts of 1961, ch. 181, 4 P·R CORP. SERVo Tenn. 109
(1961» ; Texas (Aets of 1961, S.B. 119, 4 P·R CORP. SERVo Texas 424 (1961»; Wisconoln
(Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 350, 4 P·R CORP. SERVo Wis. 339 (1961». At this writing a bill is
awaiting gubernatorial action in Alabama. Bills were introduced but not enacted in Call·
fomia, Iowa, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
I have excluded from the discussion that follows certain pre·1961 statutcs of u spccialized
character, such as the Connecticut law authorizing the creation of Medical Group Clinic
Corporations. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-180 (Supp. 1959). This statute, prior to its
amendment by Public Law 394 of 1961, evoked a favorable unpublished ruling. P·R CUR·
RENT DEC. 11 54,753 (1961). The full texts of these statutes unavailablo when this article
was prepared.
3 The sources of these prohibitions on corporate practice of medicine, law, and other pro·
fessions vary from state to state and are ebscure in some. As to medicine, see generally
Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 432, 435-449
(1960). As to law, see generally DRINKER, LEGAL ETllICS 159-169 (1953); Opinion tJ83,
OPINIONS OF ABA COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GIlIEVANCES (1957). For
these and other professions, see 1 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 97 (1931). Although
the content of tlle term" corporate practice" of a profession is uncertain, especinlly where
professional services are provided only to employees of a common employer or are other-
wise peripheral to the corporation's main activities, we are here concerned with professional
groups whose sole function is to render professional services to the public.
i! Section 21 of the Oklahoma statute makes this alarming pronunciamento: "It being
immediately necessary for the preservation ef the public peace, health and safety, an emer·
gency is hereby declared to exist, by renson whereof this act shall take effect and be in full
force from and after its passage and lIpproval." This deelaration presumably satisfies art.
5, § 58, of the Oklahoma Constitution, providing that legislative actien shnll not take effect
until 90 days after the adjournment of the session, unless an emergency is deelared by 11
vote of two-thirds of the membership of each house. As to federal tax reduction, evidently
Oklahoma's state motto is "The Sooner, the better."
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either bow to the state innovations or accept federal legislation that
itmay find no less distasteful¥
The thesis of this article is that history has not repeated itself. In
my opinion, the professional associations and corporations author-
ized by the 1961 wave of state legislation should not be classified as
"corporations" for federal income tax purposes, at least not before
a go.od many ambiguities in their status under state law have been re-
solved.
Five of the statutes (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania) authorize professional practitioncrs to organize
"associations" or "professional associations" for the practice of
their profession; these laws eschew the label"corporation," and
Georgia explicitly states that the group is "unincorporated." Al-
though some of the provisions of the state corporation laws are made
applicable to these groups, they also bear some carmarks of unin-
corporated groups, and their status under the Internal Revenue
Code depends upon whether they are "associations" within the
meaning of section 7701(a)(3). The "professional corporation"
laws (Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Oldahoma, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, and Wisconsin) employ the term "corporation," sometimes
amplified to "professional corporation," just as sedulously as the
"association" statutes avoid it. Without drawing dircctly on the
law of unincorporated associations, however, the)' impose restric-
tions on the professional corporation that are not applicable to typ-
ical business corporations.1i As will be s('cn, the two types of stat-
utes 6 are not sufficiently different, in my opinion, to warrant differ-
ent classification in applying the federal income tax.
5 I do not mean to imply, here or Inter, that the term t t corporahon" has nn immutable
single reference. State law customarily includes ll. general businC'ss corporation 13w, and
then goes on to provide other rules to govern some nspects of till.' ('reatioD, operntion, and
liquidation of specinlized corporations: membership corporations, finnnrial in!>titutions,
railroad, and utility companies, etc. In a. sense, thereforc, there i:i no such creature as
"tlle" corporation. All of the groups just named, nnd others as well, mal· emplo)' the law]
"corporation" without cngaging in misappropriation or usurpation. Moreovcr, when Con·
gress referred to "corporations" in the Internal Re\'cJlue C,()uc, it intended to embrace a
variety of groups with varying characteristics. But having s:Jid this, primarilj· to avoid n
clIarge of conceptuallim in using tile term"corporation," I alii procceuing on the Uwor.}"
that in applying the Internal Revenue Code, 'l\'e must cla&>ifj' nO\'('1 or borderline ltusine[s
groups in the manner employed in Morrissey v. COnlm'r, 296 U.S. 3401 (1935), ~'i;:., b)· com-
paring the characteristies of the group under examination with the clmracteristics of
"typical" or "ordinary" corporations. A businC'ss group is not llec('L":lril~' a. "corpora·
tion" merely because ever)" one of its characteristics mal' be fOUIIlI,. if we go far enough
afield and draw upon enough instances, in some other group tJ13t is indisputnlJlj· a corpora-
tion. Since we must exercise judgment in generalizing from specifie instances, this type of
taxonomy ill not an exact science.
6 The Texas provision, part of the curiously denominated "TexllB Uniform Parlnership
Act," ill characteristically sui generis. We arc told by section 6(3) :
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In addition to these differences in the state laws, there are other
differences of a more substantial character. Some states permit only
medicine to be practiced in group form j others extend the privilege
to a long list of professions or to any profession requiring a license.
Some states permit an individual practitioner to take advantage of
the legislation j others require at least two or three to make the elec-
tion. There are other substantive differences among these laws, to
some of which I shall refer hereafter.
In my discussion, I shall assume that the statutes are valid under
state law, although the authority of the courts over the practice of
law may cast a shadow in some states upon the validity of legislative
action in this area,7 and there may be problems of a constitutional,
ethical, or other nature in other professions as well. I shall also
assume that state licensing agencies, whose power to regulate pro-
fessional practice by persons under their aegis is explicitly or im-
plicitly preserved by all the statutes, will impose no restrictions
upon the new-born professional associations or corporations which
would weaken whatever claim to be taxed as corporations they may
derive from the naked language of the statutes. Should the Okla-
homa Board of Optometry, for example, exercise its power under
Title 59, section 585, of the Oklahoma statutes to provide that a pro-
fessional corporation will lose its franchise if one of its shareholders
becomes a habitual drunkard or succumbs to a contagious disease, I
should suppose that optometry corporations in that state would not
enjoy the kind of "continuity of life" that is possessed by ordinary
business corporations.
Moreover, I shall also set aside the possibility that professional
associations and corporations wishing to practice law, accountancy,
"An association is not a partnership under this Act if:
" (a) The word' association' or 'associates' is part of and nlways used in tho namo
under which it transacts business, and
" (b) Its assumed name certificates, filed in :lccordance with law, contain a statomont
substantially as follows: 'This association intends not to be governed by the Toxas Uniform
Partnership Act,' and
"(0) The business it transacts is wholly or partly cngaging in an activity in which cor·
porations cannot lawfully engage.
"This Subsection shall not be construed to change in any way tho law applicablo to nsso·
ciations which are not partnerships under this Act." Texas Acts 1961, S.B. 119, 4 P·R
CORP. SERvo Texas 424 (1961).
I exercise an author's prerogative of exempting this statute, the legal offect of which
escapes me, from my remarks.
1 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935).
The Supreme Court of Florida has authorized Florida lawyers to orgnnize under tho
Florida Professional Service Corporation Act. In the Matter of The Florida Bar, 30 U.S.
L.WEEK 2217 (1961).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 17 Tax L. Rev. 5 1961-1962
1961J PROFESSIOXAL ASSOCIATIONS AND FEDERAL I:-JCO~IE TAX.-\TION 5
or other professions before federal agencies may be required to re-
linquish some of the pridleges accorded to'tht:'m by state law, result-
ing in an adverse impact 011 their federal tax status. Finallr, my
discussion will be confined to the question whether }lroft:'ssional asso-
ciations and corporations qualify as "corporations JJ within the
meaning of section 7701(a) (3) of the Code, t:'xcludillg other tax hur-
dles that they may encounter in achieving some of their intended pur-
poses even if they succeed in attaining corporate status.8
8 Even if these organizations are classified as U corporations, II some of UIO federal tax
results for which their nlembers or sharehohlers )'earn nla)' elude tltem. At least four Iturdles
remain to be surmounted:
1. Assignment of income doctrine. If tlte arrangement between tlte sltareholders and their
corporation is an "assignment of earncd ineome," within tlte \'ngue contours of cnal'S JilIO
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), it will not be recognized for federal income tnx pur·
poses. In appropriate cases, this doctrine would permit tlte fees :lIld oUIC:r professional in·
come to be attributed to tIle persons whose personal sen'ic('s created the income rather thnn
to the association or corporation. Some of the income might be approprint('I)' alJocnted to
the corporation, as compensation for tIlO use of equipment, etc. owned by it, but in most
professional 1irms, virtually all of the income is attributable to sen'ices ratlter tbtlll to
capital. The Government's c:u:e for a reallocation would be strong('sl if lite professional cor·
poration were olVlled by a single person. Associations nnd corporations ,,,,ith two or more
shareholders would be less vulnerable, since an arm's·length pooling of incomo does not
ordinarily invoke the no-assignment·of·earned·income doctrine.
2. "Sham" transaction t1leory. In Comm'r v. Laugltton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940),
the Government attacked the validity of a corporatIOn thnt emplo)'ed its Eole sbareholder
(Charles Laughton) under an exclusive contr:1ct at a salary vcr,r nluch less than the com·
pany received for "loaning" him to motion picture producers. The Court framed the
issue as "whether Laugllton's hiring of hilllself to ••• [the corporation] for n salary sub-
stantially less than the compensation for which the corporation 5upplied his llerviceJ as its
employee to various motion picture producers, constituted, in effect, n single transaction
by Laughton in which he received indirectly the larger SUIll paid b)' tI,e producors," and
remanded the case to ilie Board of Tax Appeals for further findings. ld. at 104. Tho result
on remand is not reported. The Court's oI,inion speaks int('rchungenbl)' of ,. a Bingle trans-
action" and" a sham transaction." Since the Lallgllton case, the Go\'crmnent hns relied on
the personal holding cOlllpany tax te reach such nrrang('lUenls, but lhe LaugMon cnoo re-
mains a potent weapon which the Government might turn ngainst professional corpora·
tions, especially those with only a single shareholder.
Both Laughton and Lucas 'II. Earl ma)' seem especially pertinent if tbe practitioner en·
gages in practice simultaneously as tlIl individual and in corporate form. See Ma)'cs v.
United States, 207 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1953), and W. B. Mnyes, Jr., 21 T.C. 286 (1953).
Many attorneys may find parallel offices unnvoidnble, since they will probaLl)' continue to be
named personally to executorships, trusteeships, gUllrdianships, and olber judicially Ilupor·
vised posts.
I need hardly suggest the relevance of section 269 and of such cases as Gregor)' v. Helver·
ing, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), Paymer v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 33-1 (2d Cir. 1945), :rnd National
Investors Corp. v. Hoe)', 1-14 F.2d 4.66 (2d Cir. 1944), to professional associations tlIld cor·
porations organized soleI)' to lay a foundation for federal tax bencfits. The fnct that Rev.
Ral. 56-23, 1956-1 Cu~. BULL. 598, ruling that a group of doctors wlto adopt the form ot
an association in order to establish a qualified pension or profit·sharing plan must be treated
as a partnership, was revoked by Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 CUlt. BULL. 88li, does not pre·
clude a revival of this theory.
3. Professional persons as <C independent contractors." In the case of United States v.
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ccPROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION" STATUTES
Turning first to the statutes authorizing the creation of II profes-
sional associations, " I should like to base my discussion on the Geor-
gia Professional Association Act,S which for convenience is set out
in full at the end of this article.
Under the Georgia Act, two or more persons licensed to practice a
profession under the laws of Georgia, including attorneys, certified
public accountants, physicians, and dentists, may form a profes-
sional association (" as distinguished from a partnership" accord-
ing to section 2(b) of the Act) to carryon their profession by execut-
ing and filing Articles of Association. The association may have
shareholders ("stock-type association") or members ("non-stock
association"). In either event, their interests are described as freely
transferable, except as restricted by the Articles. Members or share-
holders must be duly licensed to render the professional service for
which the association is organized, except that the estate of a de-
ceased member or shareholder may retain his interest for a reason-
able period of administration, but without participating in decisions
concerning the rendering of professional service, and a share or
membership may be sold or otherwise transferred only to another
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), physicians werl' held to be 1/ employees" so as to be
entitled to participate in n qualified pension plan. It is possible, however, that the 1/ pro-
fessional relationship" provision of the professional association and corporation laws will
be interpreted to mean that the physician or other professional is an independent contractor
rather than an employee, and hence not qualified for participation in a pension or profit-
sharing plan. This would not alter the character of the association or corporation itself, but
it would destroy the principal attraction that corporate status possesses for the professional
man. Sce Rev. Rut. 61-178, 1961 INT. REV. BULL. No. 41, at 8, holding that a physician waD
an "employee" of a business corporation rather than an independent contractor for ooeial
security and withholding tax purposes; one of the elements establishing the status of em·
ployee was that he was subject to supervision" as to the manner in which his services aro to
be performed."
4. Personal holding company tax. The inceme of some-perhaps most-professional asso-
ciations and corporations would probably be "personal holding company income" by virtue
of section 543(a) (5) (1954), and the stock ownership requirement of section 542(a) (2)
(1954) is also likely to be satisfied by most such groups. If the professional association or
corporation is a personal holding company, it cannot be used to split income between the
practitioner and his corporation, since the virtually confiscatory rate of the personal hold-
ing company tax 'Would penalize any accumulation of income in the corporate treasury. Uoe
of the corporation for the purpose of creating a. pension plan would not be precluded, how-
ever, since the personal holding company tai is computed only after business expenses hnve
been deducted. A personal holding company tax on the residue could ordinarily be avoided
by distributing the corporation's income in the form of salaries and dividends or by making
an election under Subchapter S. •
9 Ga.. Acts 1961, Act 285, 2 P-H CORP. SERVo Ga. 115 (1961). See .APPENDIX, pp. 36-40
infra.
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duly licensed person. The association may render professional serv-
ices only through persons who are themselves duly licensed, and the
laws applicable to the relationship between the professional and his
patient or client are not modified. Subject to this preservation of the
professional relationship, a member or shareholder of·the associa-
tion is not personally liable for the association's debts unless he per-
sonally participated in the transaction out of which the debt arose.
The association shall be governed by a Board of Goverllors elected
by the members or shareholders, "so that centralization of manage-
ment will be assured," and a person shall not have the power to bind
the association merely by virtue of his being a member or share-
holder. The association "shall continue as a separate entity inde-
pendent of its members or shareholders for all purposes" for the
time provided in its Articles or until dissolved by a vote of two-
thirds of its members, notwithstanding the death, withdrawal, or
expulsion of a member, the transfer of membership or share owner-
ship, the admission of new members, or any other event that would
work the dissolution of a partnership under Georgia law.
If a member, shareholder, agent, or employee of a professional
association becomes legally disqualified to practice his profession,
he must sever his financial interest in, or emploj'ment with, the asso-
ciation. An association that violates this requirement may be dis-
solved. If the Articles fail to fix the price at which the association or
its members or shareholders may purchase the interest of a de-
ceased, retired, expelled, or disqualified member or shareholder, the
price shall be book value as determined by an independent certified
public accountant.
An association may contract, hold and transfer real property, and
sue and be sued in the firm name, and its assets arc not liable to at-
tachment for the individual debts of its members or shareholders.
Finally, the association shall be governed "by all laW's governing or
applicable to corporations, where applicable" if not in contlict with
the provisions of the Georgia Professional Association Act, and" no
such association shall be held or deemed to be a partnership nor
shall such association be governed by laws relating to partner-
ships."
The federal income tax status of the Georgia Professional Asso-
ciation depends upon whether it is an "association" within the
meaning of section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In
commenting on this question, I shall accept the Regulations recently
issued under section 7701(a) (3) as a valid interpretation of the stat-
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ute.IO We may appropriately and conveniently commence with the
statement in the Regulations: 11
... since associates and an objective to carryon business and divide tho
gains therefrom are generally common to both corporations and partner.
ships, the determination of whether an organization which has such character·
istics is to be treated for tax purposes as a partnership or as an association
[and, hence, as a corporation] depends on whether there exists centraliza-
tion of management, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and
limited liability.
Let us then examine the Georgia Professional Association to see if it
possesses these four corporate characteristics.12
A. LIMITED LIABILITY
Section 7 of the Georgia Professional Association Act has the fol-
lowing to say about the personal liability of members and sharehold-
ers of a professional association:
This Act does not modify any law applicable to the relationship between a
person furnishing professional service and a person receiving such service,
including liability arising out of such professional service, and including the
confidential relationship between the person rendering the professional serv-
ice and the person receiving such professional service, if any, and all confiden.
10 See generally Lyons, Comments on tl'e New Rpglliations on Associations, 16 TAX
L. REV. 441 (1961). Efforts to establish that the new Regulations arc erroneous in employ-
ing local law, as in Ray, Corporate Tax Treatment of Medical Clinics Organized as Associa·
tio?lS, 39 TA.~ES 73 (1961), seem to me quite unsuccessful. When the old Regulntions said
that" local law is of no importance," what was obviously mennt was that locallnw did not
determine the organization's classification, and the new Regulations are in accord. But in
determining whether the organization enjoyed continuity of life, centralized managemont,
etc., the old Regulations looked to loeal law, as the new Regulations do. The simple fact is
that there is no otller place to find the organization's legal characteristics, as distinguished
from its proper classification for federal income tax purposes.
11 Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2 (a) (2) (1960).
12 The Regulations' state that in addition to the six "major characteristics" listed in
the above extract, "other factors may be found in some cases which may be significant in
classifying an organization as an association, a partnership, or a trust" (Reg. Seo.
301.7701-2 (a) (1) (1960», but no other such "factors" are identified. I shall refor in
the text to at least three characteristics of professional a~sociations and corporations that
probably belong in this category of other" factors"; all, to my mind, aro earmarks of
non-eorporate status. They are: (1) the fact thnt members or sharellolders must possess
certain personal characteristics (they must be qualified to practice tho profession; they
evidently must not be felons; and in some instances they may not hold certain publio
offices or own shares in oth!'r professional corporations); (2) the fact that the vicissitudes
of personal life (disqualification to practice, retirement, death, perhaps bankruptcy or
conviction of a felony) may impose on the shareholder a duty to dispose of his interest l
and (3) the fact that some professional asseciations (sce note 41 infra) arc evidently not
'required to have any capital, to treat their capital or earnings as a I I trust fund" for
creditors, or to meet any fin:mcial standards in the distribution of assets or the repurohaso
of shares. See notes 27, 28, 29, and 31 infra.
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tial relationships previously enjoyed under the laws of this State or herein-
after enacted shall remain inviolate. Subject to the fOl'('going pL'o\'isions of
this Section, the members or shareholdcrs of any professional association or-
ganized pursuant to the provisions of this Aet sllallnot u(' in<1h'i<1nall~'liable
for the debts of, or claims against, the professional nssoeiation unless such
member or shareholder has personally participated in the transaction for
which the debt or claim is made or out of which it aris('s.
The more general language of section 18 should also be noteu, al-
tliough section 7 probably preempts the snbject of personalliabilit)·
and leaveslittIe, if any, room for the operation of section 18 in this
area:
Such professional association organized punmant to tllc provisions of this
Act shall be governed generally by all laws gO\'(,l'ning: or upp1i('aule to COl'PO-
rations, where applicable, and not in eoufliet 11l'1't'with, und no snch associa-
tion shall be held or deemed to be a pal'tnership nor shall sueh association bc
governed by laws relating to partnerships.
Returning to section 7, we may profitably examine tIle first sen-
tence at some length. Not only is it found, with minor variations, in
most of the professional association and professional corporation
statutes, but its inclusion in these statutes was probably essc.'lltial to
their quick and painless enactment. I do not think it is fanciful to en-
vision the following dialogue between legislator and lobbyist in all
of these states:
Q. "'What is the purpose of this bill ~
A. It will enable doctors, lawyers, and others to get certain feu-
eral income tax advantages now unfairly denied to them.
Q. But will these laws affect the patient or client ~
A. Absolutelynot.
Q. How canI be sure of that ~
A. Lookat Section (insert appropriate number).
If section 7 of the Georgia Act and its counterpart in other states
did no more than prevent the professional's personalliabilit)· for his
own negligence in rendering services to a patient or client from be-
ing reduced or eliminated by the intervention of a professional asso-
ciation or corporation, it would be of little conseqnence to profes-
sionals or laymen. This is because the employee of a corporation is
liable for his own negligence, notwithstanding the concurrent lia-
bility of his employer under the doctrine of 1'espo1Zdeat .~llZJeriorJ and
a professional employee of a professional association or corporation
would be subject to this rule even in the absence of a provision like
section 7 of the Georgia Act. It seems more consonant witb the pur-
pose of the Georgia Act, and with its language as well, however, to
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construe section 7 as preserving intact the entire congeries of rela-
tionships between an individual practitioner and his patients or
clientsY In the case of a physician, for example, this would include
liability for the torts or other misconduct of the nurses, laboratory
assistants, and other technicians who work under his direction or
supervision, even though in the case of an ordinary business corpo-
ration an employee is not responsible for the misconduct of fellow
employees unless it results from his own misconduct.
In preserving the professional relationship,14 the scope of the first
sentence of section 7 is not restricted to tort liability. The private
practitioner also has a contractual liability to his patient or client,
and recent cases have seen an expansion of liability in this area, es-
pecially in suits against physicians for failure to effect a promised
cure.15 In the case of an ordinary business corporation, employees
are not liable for breach of a contract made in the employer's name;
they act as agents, not as principals. I know of no exception to this
rule for professionals employed by a corporation. ·When a physician
in the medical department of a business corporation treats an in-
jured workman, I should not suppose that he is liable for breach of
contract if the patient fails to get the relief implicitly or explicitly
promised to him. A member or shareholder of a Georgia professional
association, however, is liable to patients in both contract and tort, if
I read the first sentence of section 7 correctly, in precisely the same
fashion as though he were practicing privately.
Do I stretch the first sentence of section 7 unduly by the further
suggestion that it saddles a professional association with the mutual
agency, resulting in mutual liability, that exists among the members
of a professional partnership 1 Suppose the partners of the law firm
of Smith, Jones and Brown reconstitute themselves as the Smith,
Jones & Brown Professional Association under the Georgia Act. If
the association renders an opinion, would only the member who
wrote it be personally responsible' Or would personal liability also
be imposed on those of his fellow members whom he consulted in
13 Since the attorne:r-client and other professional prh'ilcges nre surely to be preserved
by the Georgia Act, it seems to me incontrovertible that the term II any law" in section 7
includes common law rules of liability and rules of evidence, not merely statutes.
H Here and elsewhere I have used the term" professional relationship" as a label for
the first sentcnce of section 7 of the Georgia Act, although it refers to "the" relationship
between the person furnishing professional service and the person receiving such service,
including liability" arising out of" the profcssionnl service. If a patient slips on a rug
in a physician's reception room, he may be personally liable under section 7 i and even
more remote events may be part of "the" relationship between the physician and hiD
patient or be held to "arise out of" the professional service.
10 Miller, The Contractual Liability of Pllysicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 413.
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preparing the opinion; on those who appear in the firm name j on
those whose reputations led or may have'led the client to come to
the firm ~ Or are all members of the association personally liable on
the ground that, being associated in the practice of law, each one is
"a person furnishing professional service" within the meaning of
section 7 to any client of the firm ¥
If a client's funds are mishandled, does the Georgia Act contem-
plate that he may look only to the association and to the member or
shareholderwho engaged in the wrongdoing¥ Lawrers have recently
been exhorted to establish Clients' Security Funds on the ground
that "we are responsible one for another and all of us for each of
us." 16 Whether this is true or not, a limitation of the phrase" per-
son furnishing professional service" as used in section 7 of the Geor-
gia Act and in similar statutes to the precise members of an asso-
ciation who personally participated in the transaction out of which
the liability arose is one of those legal consequences I should have to
see in a judicial opinion to believe. This is not to say that the state
legislatures might not at some time choose to permit professionals
to substitute corporate for personal responsibility, but it should not
be lightly assumed that this change has been consummated by a stat-
ute that explicitly provides that the relationship between the person
rendering professional services and the person receiving the serv-
ices is not altered.
Section 7 of the Georgia Act does not define the phrase "person
receiving such [professional] service." This term could be inter-
preted in the narrow sense of patient or client, but it might also be
interpreted to embrace any person who relies on or is guided by the
professional service in question, e.g., the purchaser of business as-
sets who relies on the legal opinion of the seller's attorney or on
financial statements certified by the seller's accountant. ·Willing as
the state legislatures may have been to assist accountants and at-
torneys to reduce their federal income tax burden, I doubt that they
intended to take the radical step of undermining the confidence
which members of the business community have come to feel they
may properly place in opinions and certificates of this kind. For
this reason, the phrase "person receiving such service" in section 7
should probably be interpreted to include any person who 'Would
have been entitled, in the absence of a professional association, to
hold the professional who rendered the service liable for a misstate-
ment, omission, or other defect.
In preserving the professional relationship, what is the impact of
111 Smith,.A. Debt of Honor, 47 A,B.A.J. 791 (1961).
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section 7 on books and records arising from the rendition of profes-
sional services1 In the absence of an association, such documents
belong to the professional. If an association is interposed between a
physician and his patient, however, do the documents belong to the
association, or does section 7 have the effect of vesting ownership in
the physician' If it does, can personal ownership be negated by an
agreement between the physician and his association1 The issue of
ownership could be raised in any of several ways: a withdrawing
associate might seek to take the records of "his" patients with him;
a physician might refuse to produce subpoenaed documents on the
ground that they are personal papers that may be withheld under the
Fifth Amendment; etc. If such claims are upheld, there would be one
more distinction between ordinary business corporations and pro-
fessional associations upon which the Internal Revenue Service
might rely to establish that the association is not a "corporation."
The preceding discussion has been concerned solely with the
meaning of the first sentence of section 7 of the Georgia Act, which
may be found, with minor variations, in most of the statutes under
review. The second sentence of section 7 need not detain us so long,
since, important as it may be in Georgia, it is not found in the stat-
utes of other states. In denying the privilege of limited liability, if
the member or shareholder "has personally participated in the
transaction for which the debt or claim is made or out of which it
arises, " the second sentence of section 7 is not limited, as is the first
sentence, to relations between the professional and the person re-
ceiving professional services. Rather, it appears to make it impos-
sible for a member or shareholder to act solely in a representative
capacity even in the non-professional aspects of the association's
business. Ifhe signs a lease, fires a secretary, or borrows funds, he is
apparently personally liable, even though he purports to act solely
on behalf of the association; 17 and it may even be that he has "per-
sonally participated" in a transaction if it is effected by an employee
or agent acting under his direction or supervision.
Since the second sentence of section 7 is idiosyncratic to Georgia,
however, our main concern is whether the first sentence, in preserv-
ing the professional's relationship with his patient or client, is cor.
17 It is arguable tllat the term" personally participated" docs not embrace transactions
which the member or sllareholder undertook in a representative capadty. But sitch n narrow
reading of this part of section 7 is hard to accept, since non·representative transactions
would not give rise to debts of or claims against the association. It is almost equally difficult
to accept the notion that personal1iability attaches to transactions in which the member
or shareholder "personally participated" as a member er shareholder, but not to trans·
actions in wllich he participated as an employee or agent of the association.
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sistent with the kind of "limited liability" required by the Regula-
tions promulgated uncleI' section 7701(a) (3) : 18
An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if un-
der local law there is no member who is personally liabIt! for the debts of 01'
claims against the organization. Personal liability means that a creditor of an
organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of the organiza-
tion to the extent that the assets of such organization are insufficient to satisfj'
the creditor's claim.
Although the limited liability granted to shareholders of ordinary
business corporations is sometimes subject to statutory exceptions,10
they infringe only slightly on the basic principle of limited liability.
The first sentence of section 7, by contrast, subjects the professional
to uniimited liability for the most important business risks of a pro-
fessional practice, and grants immunity only from the less serious
claims of landlords, suppliers, and employees. The difference is one
of degree, to be sure, but it is a big one. If I read the first sentence of
section 7 aright, I can only conclude that the limited liability it
grants is too emaciated to satisfy the Regulations.
B. CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT
Under the Regulations, an organization has "centralized manage-
ment" if exclusive authority to make the management decisions
necessary to the association's business is vested in one or more, but
less than all, of its members.2o Applying this standard to the Georgia
professional association, we :find that section 8 of the Georgia Act
purports to centralize management in the Board of Governors to the
exclusion of the membership.
Neither the Regulations nor the Georgia Act define the term
"management." Is it limited to renting quarters, hiring and firing
secretaries, purchasing supplies, and like details of housekeeping?
Or, since the association is organized "for the purpose of carrying
on a profession and dividing the gains therefrom," 21 does "manage_
ment" also embrace professional decisions affecting the associa-
tion's clientele, such as the patients to be accepted j the policies and
routines to be followed in ordering laboratory tests, consultations,
18 Reg. Sec. 301.7101-2 (d)(l) (1960).
19 For a description of" added liability" statutes, seo13A FLETCHER, PmVATE ~IlPOlU­
TIOKS §§ 6223 through 6581 (1961). Except for banks, where the ac1c1ec1liability of sbare-
holders is often limited to a speeified amount rather than unlimitec1, these exceptions to the
rule of limited liability are orc1inarily confined to particular classes of debts, primarily
wages due eertain employees and debts for materinls and supplies.
20 Reg. Sec. 301.7101-2 (c) (1960).
21 Ga. Act § 3, p. 36 infra.
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and other diagnostic aids; the professional procedures to be em-
ployed or avoided; the keeping of records; the fees to be charged;
etc. YThe Georgia Act implies that the Board of Governors will
sometimes make "decisions constituting the practice of [the
group's] profession" since it forbids an unlicensed person to par-
ticipate in such decisions.22 To the extent that this contemplates pro-
fessional decisions by a Board of Governors composed of less than
all of the members or shareholders, it is not easily reconciled with
the preservation of the traditional responsibility of each profes-
sional to his patient or client 23 or with his continuing personal re-
sponsibility to the appropriate state licensing board.
But if the Board of Governors does not have control over the pro-
fessional practice of the association's members, is management cen-
tralized as the Regulations requireY To be sure, the general counsel
or staff physician of a business corporation has professional re-
sponsibilities that he may not abdicate to the corporation's board of
directors, and his independence does not impair the centralization
of management in such corporations. But in such cases the inde-
pendence of the attorney or physician is peripheral to the corpora-
tion's business activities, and the other corporate characteristics
are ordinarily present in unalloyed form. With the professional as-
sociation, however, professional practice is the be-all and end-all of
the organization, and the professional independence in question is
that of the members or shareholders, not merely that of an employee.
The question, then, is whether the members or shareholders of a
professional association have authorized a fraction of their number
to make" the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the
business for which the organization was formed," as required by the
Regulations,24 in view of each associate's continuing personal re-
sponsibility for the conduct of his professional practice. Evidently
each member in rendering professional services may, by virtue of
the first sentence of section 7, bind the association with respect to its
most important functions, e.g., as to character of treatment to be pro-
vided, risks to be assumed, extent of cure warranted, fee to be
charged, etc., as a member of a professional partnership may bind
his firm. If so, there is a diffusion of power in the professional asso-
ciation that makes it more anarchic than totalitarian. I need hardly
add that section 7701(a)(3) abhors anarchy. In my opinion, then,
22 Ga. Act § 8, pp. 37-38 infra. See also the restriction on participation in professional
decisions by the estate of a deceased member. ld. § 10 pp. 38-39 infra.
28 Ga. Act § 7, p. 37 infra.
U Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2 (c) (1) (1960).
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the professional association enjoys only a loose kind of centralized
management, like the latcr Roman Empire, so that this corporate
characteristic, though not totally absent, is too debilitated to gct full
credit in applying the Regulations.
C. CONTINUITY OF LIFE
The "corporate characteristic" of "continuity of life" is defined
by the Regulations as freedom from dissolution upon the death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of a mem-
ber.25 Although section 9 of the Georgia Professional Association
Act purports to confer on the professional association the same con-
tinuity of life that is granted to ordinary business corporations, an
examination of other parts of the Georgia Act demonstrates that the
association is not as immune to the vicissitudes of its members' pri-
vate lives as section 9 at first suggests.
In keeping with the requirement that members or shareholders
must be licensed to practice the profession in which the association
is engaged, section 11 provides that a member or shareholder must
sever his financial interest in the association upon losing his profes-
sional standing or accepting a public office that is inconsistent with
rendering professional service. To aid in enforcing this requirement,
section 13 requires the association to file an annual statement, certi-
fying that all members of shareholders are duly licensed, and sec-
tion 11 provides that an association with a disqualified member or
shareholder may be dissolved. Even in ordinary business corpora-
tions, to be sure, the right to own stock is occasionally denied to
certain classes of persons,20 but I know of no parallel to the provision
in section 11 for dissolution of the association if a disqualified mem-
ber or shareholder does not withdraw.
n may be argued that section 11 is not inconsistent with continuity
of life, because the tainted member or shareholder could be required
to sell his interest to the association or to its members or sharehold-
ers if he fails to transfer it promptly to a qualified person. Indeed,
section 12 provides that if the articles of association or by-laws do
not fix a price at which a disqualified person's interest may be pur-
chased, the price shall be book value as determined by an independ-
ent certified public accountant on the basis of the association's reg-
ular method of accounting. I doubt, however, that an association
enjoys continuity of life within the meaning of the Regulations if it
25 Reg. Sec. Sln.7701-2(b) (1) (1960).
26 See discussion p. 18 infra.
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can avoid dissolution only by repurchasing the shares of a disquali-
fied member, especially if its use of funds to effect such a repurchase
is restricted by the state's general corporation law. On the other
hand, if the association seeks to protect its continuity of life by pro-
viding in its articles or by-laws that an offending member may bo
"expelled" with a concomitant loss of his interest in the association,
the possibility of such a forfeiture may impair or destroy the "free
transferability" of the association's shares.21
Not only a member's disqualification to practice or election to pub-
lic office, but also his death, bankruptcy, or retirement may imperil
the association's life. As to a member's death, section 10 states that
a decedent's estate "may continue to hold stock or membership pur-
suant to the Articles of Association for a reasonable period of ad-
ministration of the estate," 28 but we are not told what happens when
that period of time expires. If the estate has not found a qualified
purchaser, must the association repurchase the membership lest it
be dissolved for having an unqualified member 7 If so, the associa-
tion's claim to immortality is weakened by the fact that the associa-
tion may not have funds at the critical time to effect tho repurchase,
27 The statement in section 9 of the Georgia Act (and in parallel proviaions of tho stat·
utes of other states) that the professional association" shall continue notwithstanding the
... expulsion of anyone or more of the members or shareholders" is puzzling, since we
are told nothing about the permissible grounds for expulaion or about its legal consequellces.
Docs expulsion carry with it a forfeiture of the member's entire interest in tho association'
Docs it leave his economic interest intact, provided he disposes of it to a qualified persen
within a reasonable period of time, as in the case of the estate of a deceased member' Doell
it result only in the loss of the member's right to vote? May the charter or by·laws provide
for expulsion without cause, in the same manner that they may proville for removal of
directors without causeY No matter how these questions aro answered, and dcspito tho
statutory assurance that the expulsion of a member will not disrupt tho organization 'Il
continuity of life, the concept of expulsion is more compatible with the traditions of
partnership law than with those of corporate law.
28 If the association's earnings are not fully distributed during this interim period as
salaries to the active members, the estate will evidently sharo in professional fecs, Dither
through dividend distributions or by reason of the increase in its equity, in violation of
the ethical rules of some professions, e.g., law. If this rcsult is avoided by a system of
allocating the undistributed income to the shares of the active members, thus sterilizing tho
shares of the deceased member during this interim period, there will be a departure from
the usual rule of corporate law that one share is as good as the next. See note 12 supra.
I do not mean to suggest that the estate of a deceased partner could not receivo a share of
the firm's fees earned in future years as a substitute for its share of the firm's assets at the
date of death. See, e.g., the agreelllent in Carter v. Comm 'r, 36 B.T.A. 60 (1937). But if tho
estate, by reason of the deccdcnt's membership in a professional association, can sit pas'
sively by while its equity in the firm increases in value by reason of the services of the reo
maining members, an ethical question seems present. I am not sure that the agreement in
Coates V. Comm'r, 7 T.e. 125 (1946), would be proper for a law firm, unless the estato's
share of the post·death earniags represent payment for its share of the firm's good 'I7ill
at the date of death.
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or may be forbidden by state law to use its funds for this purpose.
If the estate's failure to find a qualified purcbaser within the speci-
fied period results in a forfeiture of the membership, the associa-
tion's continuity of life will be protected, but tbe mC'mbC'rship's
"free transferability" is then impaired. The Georgia Act is equally
obscure on the consequences of a member's bankruptcr. \\11en his
interest passes to a trustee in bankruptcy, doC's it e,·apornte if the
trustee cannot find a qualified purchased Or must tbe association
repurchase the interest under pain of dissolution for haying an un-
qualified shareholder or member1 Similarly, as to retirement, maya
member or shareholder who retires from practice retain his shares?
If not, what is the penalty for his failure to transft'r thC'm Y
I do not claim to lmow the answers to these questions, but I do not
see how continuity of life can be claimed for the association until
the answers are vouchsafed to us.
D. FREE TRANSFERABILITY OF INTERESTS
For most professional groups, the concept of freely transferable
membership is ludicrous. The Georgia Professional Association Act
provides in section 10, however, that shares or memberships" shall
be freely transferable except as may be lawfully restricted in the
Articles ot Association," subject to the requirement that members
or shareholders must be legally authorized to practice the appro-
priate profession. Although this is not clear, it may be that members
and shareholders not only must be legally qualified to practice, but
also must be actually engaged in practice. At any rate, a requirement
of active practice might be implied from section 3, which states that
two or more licensed persons may form a professional association
"by associating themselves for the purpose of carrying on a profes-
sion and dividing the gains therefrom." And it may be imposed on
lawyers, and perhaps some other professional persons as well, by an
ethical prohibition of splitting fees with persons who perform no
services. I am doubtful, in other words, tbat the Georgia Act contem-
plates a passive investment in the stock of an association engaged in
the practice of law or medicine by a person who, though licensed to
practice the profession, is inactive or retired.29
29 In providing that a member's "retirement" shall not terminate the nF~(Jcintion'8 life,
section 9 of the Georgia Act may imply that a retired member mllst ee:LSe his pnrticipntion
in management, give up his vote, dispose of his shnres, or otherwiso limit IIis relationship
to the association. This implication is strengthened by srction ] 2, which refers to "de-
ceased, retired, expelled, or disqualified" members and then spenks of "the end of tho
month immediately preceding the death of or disqualification of tho member," thus BUg·
gesting that retirement is a species of "disqunlificationIJ requiring tho member to dispose
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But whether the ownership of the professional association is re-
stricted to active practitioners or only to licensed persons, its shares
are less freely transferable than shares of the ordinary business cor-
poration. The adverse market effect of a restricted range of poten-
tial transferees might be mitigated somewhat if the association were
required to buy any shares tendered to it, but there is no such re-
quirement. A member who wants to dispose of his membership must
find a buyer by his own unaided efforts. This does not mean that the
shares are non-transferable, but their "free" transferability is im-
paired. It is, of course, true that the range of purchasers for the
shares of ordinary business corporations is sometimes restricted by
law: alien ownership may be prohibited; purchase by a competitor is
forbidden by the Clayton Act; etc. But these restrictions are appre-
ciably less onerous than the one we have been examining.3o
Though the range of potential purchasers is so narrow as to raise
doubts about the free transferability of the shares, it is probably too
broad to be tolerated by any professional association. At any rate, I
cannot envision an association that would fail (except through neg-
lect) to restrict transferability still further by requiring shares or
memberships to be offered to the association or to the members be-
fore sale to an outsider.31 Such a restriction does not in itself negate
the existence of the corporate characteristic of free transferability,
however, since the Regulations provide: 32
If each member of an organization can transfer his interest to a person who
is not a member of the organization only after having offered such interest to
the other members at its fair market value, it will be recognized that a modi·
of his stock. As "ith expulsion (see note 27 supra), changes in the member's relationship
to the organization resulting from retirement are more consistent with the traditions of
partnership law than with those of corporate law. In authorizing Florida lawyers to prac-
tice through professional corporations, Sllpra note 7, the Florida Supreme Court provided
in its rules that the practice may continue only while all sharellOlders of the corporation are
active members of the Florida Bar in good standing. Under this rule, the firm must appar-
ently cease its practice immediately upon the death, retirement, or disbarment of a share·
holder, unless his share is promptly transferred to a qualified person or acquired by tho roo
maining shareholders or the firm.
so In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), the Supremo Court hold
that a Pennsylvania statute requiring the shares of incorporated drug stores to bo owned
by registered pharmacists was unconstitutional. Without wishing to endorse tho decision,
I offer it as evidence that limitations on the right to own stock are rare indeed.
51 The mcmbers of a professional corporation might well wish to buttress tho corpora-
tion's option to buy the interest of an outgoing member with a provision reqlliring ouch
action if anyone of the remaining members insists on it. Otherwise the board of directoro
could let the option lapse if the proposed transferee was acceptable to a majority of the
remaining members or directors. Such a device for requiring unanimity in the adml:lSion
of new members could be regarded either as an impairment of the centralization of
management or as a "factor" characteristic of a partnership. See note 12 supra.
12 Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2(0) (2) (1960).
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fied form of free transferability of interests exists. In determining the classi-
fication of an organization, the presence of this modified corporate character-
istic will be accorded less significance than if such characteristic were present
in an unmodified form.
In accepting, though denigrating, this modified form of transfer-
ability, the Regulations speak of an option in the other members to
purchase the interest at its fair 'market value. 'Yill an option to pur-
chase at a price that does not take into account the value of good will
be satisfactory~ A brief detour is necessar;r before attempting to
answer this question. First of all, we may take note of the long dis-
pute over the mere existence of professional good will, in which tax-
payers have customarily argued that good will can attach to the con-
duct of a profession and that it can be transferred by one profes-
sional man to another. The Internal Revenue Service has finally
conceded that"goodwill may be recognized ill connection with the
sale of a business [the context indicates that this term includes the
practice of a profession], the success of which is ?lot dependent solely
upon the personal characteristics of the owner, even though such sale
does not comprehend a valid assignment of the exclusive usc of the
firm name." 33 Since the successful practice of a profession by some
-perhaps most-professional associations will generate good will,
it probably must be taken into account in fixing the price at which a
member's interest may be repurchased by the association if the par-
ties wish to bring themselves within the "fair market value" re-
quirement of the Regulations. If in order to avoid paying for good
will, the parties attempt to create individual ownership of each
member's contribution to the association's good will in negation of
group ownership, they may impair their claim that the orgunization
is an "association."
When a withdrawing member intends to continue in practice, a
stronger case can be made for the proposition that he will not l~ave
any good will behind him, but the case may not he strong enough. r.I.'he
Georgia Act does not tell us whether such a member is subject to any
restraints in aCC"epting patients or clients with whom he became
acquainted while employed by the association. :May he apprise them
of the termination of his relationship with the association and of his
new address ~Does section 7 give him the right to take the rC'cords of
"his" clients with him? Are these questions suhjcct to regulation by
the association's articles of association or by-laws, or are they to be
answered by extrapolation from the statute, the principles of equity,
and the canons of professional ethics ~
However these substantive issues may be resolved, a failure to
88 Rev. RuL 60-S01, 1960-2 Ctnr. BULL. 15.
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require payment for such good will as may be enjoyed and retained
by the association would be inconsistent with the "fair market
value" requirement of the Regulations. Although the Regulations
do not affirmatinly state that an option in the members to buy a
withdrawing member's interest for less than fair market value is
necessarily fatal to the existence of free transferability, the fact that
a fair market \'alue option is merely tolerated by the Regulations
("this modified corporate characteristic will be accorded less sig-
nificance....") implies that the Government, at least, will not be
very hospitable to options to buy for less than fair market value.
This in turn means that an option to purchase at book \'alue, as pro-
vided by section 12 of the Georgia Act,34 and as commonly found in
agreements among the shareholders or partners of a closely-held en-
terprise,35 would endanger a professional association's claim, al-
ready enfeebled, to free transferability of shares.
Even if the option employed by the professional association to in-
sure delectus personae conforms to the Regulations by requiring the
associates to pay fair market v&lue for the interest of a member or
shareholder who wishes to get out, the Go\'ernment might argue that
free transferability does not exist e\'en in "modified" form if, real.
istically \'ieW'ed" there is no significant likelihood that shares could
actually be transferred to outsiders without a complete reorganiza-
tion of the group's professional and financial arrangements. In the
case of most small groups of professional men, a transfer of a share
would be so likely to bring about a complete reshufllillg, that it is
difficult to perceive the kind of free transferability described in the
Regulations: 36
An organization has the eorporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests if eaeh of its members or those members owning substantially all of
the interests in the organization have the power, without the consent of other
members. to substitute for themselves in the same organization a person who
is not a mE'mbcr of the organization. In order for this power of substitution to
exist in the corporate sense, the member must be able, without the consent of
other members, to confer upon his sub-;titute all the attributes of his interest
3~ The relationship of section 1~ of the Georgia Act to the pro.ision in the income tax
Regulations on options is not clear. The R~'gulations are primarily concerned with restraints
on .oluntary transf,'rs, where'as section 1~ is concerned primarily, if not solely, with
in.oluntary transf~rs. In :lIlY e>l~nt. the book ':llne formula of section 12 is inapplicable
if the asso~i:ltion 's articles 0; h~"l:l\;s proYide another method of computing the price.
ss I do not mean to suggest that au ordinar:r busine~s corporation loses its status because
of a stock purchase agreement permitting it to UU)' the shares of a retiring or deceased
shareholuer at a low or e.en nominal amount. But what is permittl>u with re~rect to an
organization that otherwise Dleets all the tests of " corporatelless" Dlay not be tolerated
in an organization which either is on the outside seeking entrance or is at best ho.erillg
perilously on the frontier.
30 Reg. See. 301.7i01-2(e) (1) (1960).
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in the organization. Thus, the characteristic of free transferability of in-
terests does not exist in a case in which each member can, without the consent
of other members, assign only his right to share in profits but cunnot so assign
his rights to participate in the management of the organization.
MyVEBDICT
The Georgia professional association possesses the corporate
characteristics of" associates" 31 and "an objectivc to carr), on busi.
ness for joint profit, " but these must be disregarded undcr the Reg-
ulations because they are common to both corporations and partner-
ships. As to the remaining four corporate characteristics, my score-
cardreads:
Limited liability: Doubtful
Centralized management: Present in modified form
Continuity of life: Doubtful
Free transferability: Doubtful in most cases.3lI
Under the Regulations "an unincorporated organization shall not
be classified as an association unless such organization has more
corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics...." 33
How are we to classify an organization that possesses one atten-
uated corporate characteristic if its other three clmracteristics are
neither "corporate" nor "noncorporate," but borderline? It would
be possible to interpret the Regulations as classifying such an organ-
ization as a corporation, but it seems to me more likel)' that the
37 In Ohio and Pennsylvania, one person may organize n proft'ssional asso~iation. I have
elsewhere expressed the view that n one·man association should be no more surprising than
a one-man corporation. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ~nponATIO::S Af:D SilAnE·
HOLDERS § 2.07 (1961). But the Regulations evidently dt'n)' corporate st.'ltus to 11 busine:Js
organization that has only one" associate." Reg. St'c. 301.7701-2 (a) (2) (1900). E\'cn if
it surmonnts this obstacle, n one·man professional association ma)' lath continuit)' of lifo
and centralized management. See also note 42 infra.
38 Example (1) of Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2 (g) (1960) recoguizes Uw prcsCllce of n modified
form of free transferability in a se\"en·man medieal clinic whosc lUell\l,,~rs ilia)" transfer
their interests to other doctors subject to an option in the group, eJterclllllble b)' majority
Yote, to purchase at fair market value. I assume that such an arrangeull:nt ma)' correspond
to reality in the case of some medical clinics. If Ute group's pedintrician retires or dies,
the others may be content in man)· instances to have bis mcmbership transferred to another
pediatrician who is acceptable to a majority, but not to all, of the rt'maining 1Ilt'lllbers, !lnd
the entry of the new member may not produce a complete reshuffling of the relations of
the members to each other. But this degree of free transferabilit)· would not cxbt in many
professional groups. See Brooks Y. Comm'r, 36 T.e. No. 113 (1961), where the Court s.'lid of
a dental practice carried on through several offices with hired dentists that" [n]o personal
professional qualifications of ••• [the donlinant figure in the firm] entered iuto tho succt'ss
of the practiee at all." Under these circumstances, I presume the firm, or interC3ts in it,
can be bought and sold freely. I also presume that not man)' professional firms \vould wi~b
to minimize the role of personal qualifications to quite this extont.
39 Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960).
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group must affirmatively establish that it possesses at lenst three
corporate characteristics to qualify as a corporation. I conclude,
therefore, that the Georgia professional association does not meet
the standards of the Regulations.
The professional association statutes of Connecticut, Illinois,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania are not identical with the Georgia Act or
with each other, and the following distinctions are worthy of note:
CONNECTICUT
In adopting the Uniform Partnership Act, Connecticut added a
new provision, obviously based on the 1960 Regulations under sec-
tion 7701(a)(3) and, indeed, employing some of the same phrase-
ology. It provides that three or more persons licensed to practice a
profession may organize an association" if the articles of associa-
tion of the members provide that the association ... shall have at
least three of the following four attributes," the four attributes
being continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability,
and free transferability of interests.
The Connecticut statute is puzzling, however, in its failure to
state affirmatively that the attributes provided in the articles are
legally binding on members of the public, especially those without
notice.40 In this respect, the Connecticut statute is different from the
other legislation under review as well as from typical state corpora-
tion laws, which say flatly that the group or organization shall have
the attributes in question. Although the language of the Connecticut
statute may be interpreted to mean merely that the associates may
elect to avail themselves of only three of the four attributes rather
than employing all four, and that those that are selected shall be
legally effective, it is not inconceivable to me that the provisions of
the articles bind only the associates and persons with actual notice,
and that other members of the public are not affected by restrictions
on an associate's personal liability or on his authority to bind the
group by his individual act.41
40 The group that won recognition as an "association" in United States v. Kintner, 216
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), provided in its articles of asseciation for centralized manage·
ment, continuity of life, and a form of limited liability. The Court relied on theso
provisions in finding that the group was an association, without discussing their legal
force under state law. Bee also Galt v. United States, 175 F.Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959),
which similarly accepts the language of the articles of association at face value. In its
Regulations, however, the Treasury refuses to honor provisions in liD agreement that nre
unenforceable under Iecal law. Reg. Sec. 301.7701-2 (g), Example (2) (1960).
41 Otherwise the Connecticut professional association might engage in n medi1led ohell
game (one shell, four peas) by requiring the public to ascertain from nn cxlUIlinAtien of
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The Connecticut law is also distinctive in lacking the conven-
tional "professional relationship" clause found in Georgia and
other states, although perhaps the same result will be achic"cd
through a liberal reading of section 44(3), providing that the asso-
ciation "shallbe subject to the laws of thc State of Connecticut regu-
lating the practice of the profession of the individual members of
the association." If so, the statutory assurance of centralized man-
agement is weakened by the authority vested in the individual prac-
titioner by the rules of his profession, in the same wa)' that central-
ized management of the Georgia professional association is relaxed
by section 7 of the Georgia Act.
By restricting membership to professionally licl'nsecl persons
(perhaps, inferentially, to active practitioners), the Connecticut
statute impairs the free transferability of membership, as clocs the
Georgia Act, and it may also threaten the group's continuity of life
if dissolution is an appropriate remedy for a failure to expel a dis-
qualified member. As to limited liability, the articles may provide
against personal liability for the association's "debts" (not dcbts
and claims as in some other statutes), but the associates "shall in
no way limit their individual or several liability in the articles of
association, or otherwise, for any acts of reckless or wanton miscon-
duct, negligence, malpractice, professional misconduct, or tort." In
addition to preserving the member's personalliabilit)· for his own
misconduct, this proviso may expose him to personal liability for
the misconduct of his fellow members and perhaps also for that of
the association's employees and agents. At any rate, I sec no oUler
function for the reference in the clause to a member's"several"
liability.
I:r.LrnOIS
The illinois statute contains conventional provisions for ccntral-
ized management and continuity of life,42 but they grant less than
the articles of association which of the four pens, if any, is covered b}" the shell. As to
limited liability under the Connecticut statute, it should be noted timt there is no require-
ment that the associates subscribe or pay in any amount to the treasury of the associntion,
and they are apparently free at any time to withdraw any funds tImt may be accumulnted
by the association, whether the association has creditors or not. Unless restraints OD such
practices are to be found in the law of fraudulent conveyances, tIlis freedom might \'oell
lead the Connecticut courts to interpret the legislation rather narrowly.
42 Continuity of life is qualified by a reference in section 7 of the TIlinois lnw to " the
last surviving member," implying that an Illinois association must be di£.solved if its Inst
surviving member dies, becomes bankrupt, etc. This Dlay be an implicit limitation on
continuity of life for all professional associations and corporations: if ll. firm hns only
a single member or shareholder, and he dies or becomes disqunlified, there mIl bo an
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they promise because of the "professional responsibility" clause
and the denial of membership to unlicensed persons. As to limited
liability, there is an unexpected void; possibly something is to be
poured into it after being drawn by inference from the opening
statement that duly licensed professional persons "may form a
professional association, as distinguished from either a partnership
or a corporation." Another possibility, equally speculative, is that
limited liabUity is obtained, subject to the "professional relation-
ship" clause, because the association is engaged in practice as a
principal, not as the agent of its members. The transfer of "shares
or units of ownership" to other licensed persons is permitted; this
term probably is intended to mean the same as "membership" (the
term used elsewhere in the statute), but it is also possible that the
distinction embodies the rule of partnership law that a partner may
assign his' 'interest" in a partnership, but not his membership.
OHIO
The Ohio statute is similar to the illinois statute in most respects,
including its failure to provide expressly for limited liability. This
omission, however, is evidently remedied by the incorporation by
reference of all consistent portions of the Ohio general corporation
law.43
PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania statute expressly negates limited liability by
providing that the associates (a) are jointly and severally liable for
the torts of any agent or employee acting within the ordinary course
·of the association's operations and for certain misapplications of
funds, and (b) are jointly liable for all other debts and legal obliga-
tions of the association. Pennsylvania is unique also.in specifically
providing that an associate who becomes disqualified to render pro-
fessional services" shall be immediately expelled from the associa-
tion. " This provision strengthens the association's claim to continu-
interregnum before a qualified transferee can take over, during which the continuation
of business will evidently be unlawful. It is not clear whether the firm must bo dissolved
upon the occurrence of such an event. Some statutes (e.g., section 15 of tho Oklahoma
Act, note 2 81lpra) require the firm to repurchase the shares of a deceased or disqualified
shareholder within a prescribed period of time. In the case of a one·man corporation,
compliance with this requirement would produce a corporation without shareholders. Would
it belong, like ferae naturae, to whoever reduces it to possession'
.3 I have put the Ohio statute in the II association" group, since that is tho label it
employs, but I should note also that it speaks of the group's governing agreement aD
IIarticles of incorporation."
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ity of life, which under the statute is to continue despite a member's
"expulsion," and by empowering the eXlll'lled m('mb(>r to transf(>r
his membership interest, the statute prot('cts himl<.>g'allr, if not real-
istically, against a forfeiture. The Penusrh·nnia lnw lacks n "pro-
fessional :r;elationship" clause, but as a restriction on limited liabil-
ity, it is not needed in Pennsylvania, and the rest of its cont('nt may
be supplied by the provision that" professional sC'rvices shall be
rendered subject to rules aIld regulations of the profC'ssionnllic£'ns-
ingboards. "
On balance, I am not persuaded that the Connecficut, Illinois,
Ohio, or Pennsylvania statutes, despite their divergent d£'partures
from the Georgia Act, should be treated differently. In none are the
four corporate characteristics assured bc)'ond doubt i all leave a
good many troublesome questions of state law to be answered in
future years; and, for reasons to be set out later, neither the 'l'reas-
ury nor the federal courts should attempt to extrapolate such a
formidable corpus of state law in passing on federal income ta."\:
claims when this uncongenial task can he avoided.
"PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS" STATUTES
In a number of instances, the state legislation under review per-
mits professionals to carryon their practice through "corpora-
tions" or "professional corporations. " The most direct route to this
result would have been to amend the state's general corporation law
to override any legislative, common law, or administrative restric-
tions on the right of ordinary business corporations to practice the
profession in question. But the statutes are not so simple, evidently
because the state legislatures believed that the llature of profes-
sional practice called for restrictions to which ordinar)' business
corporations are not subject. Thus, the statutes preserve the profes-
sional relationship and the professional's liability to his patient or
client 44 and prohibit the o"\\'1lcrship of shares by unlicensed persons.
Do these "corporations" or "professional corporations" consti-
tute "corporations" as this term is used in the Internal Revenue
44 Tennessee may be an exception, in that it docs not include an uplicit provision like
section 7 of the Georgia Act. Perhaps a. preservation of the profl'ssionnl relntionship should
be read into section 61-105(3) (d) of the Tennessee law, providing that "tllll aE;(OCilllion
••• will be subject to the laws of the State of Tennessee rt'gulnting the practice of tho
profession••••" But see paragrnph (3) (c), which permits the articles to ne~ate personal
liability for the debts of or claims ngninst the nssocintion. Perhaps the dinlogue I imllgined
(supra p. 9) did not take place in Nashville. There nrc similnr omissions in Connecticut
and Pennsylvania, both U associntion" rather than U corporation" states. See discUEsion
pp. 22-25 supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N,Y,U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 17 Tax L. Rev. 26 1961-1962
26 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:
CodeT To the best of my knowledge, this is a novel question in the
sense that until now all organizations bearing the label" corpora-
tion" under state law have, without further inquiry, been accorded
that status for federal income tax purposes,45 the only debate in this
area having been concerned with the classification of organizations
that are not labelled" corporations" by state law.
The term "corporation," however, is not used in the Internal
Revenue Code to embrace all organizations to which a state chooses
to apply the label" corporation," any more than state use of the
label "association" automatically makes the group an "assooia-
tion" under section 7701(a)(3). Rather, the Code uses the term
"corporation" as a brief summary of a group of legal consequences
attached by state law to a business organization.46 To take an ex-
treme example, if Hawaii were to amend its version of the Uniform
Partnership Act by striking out the word "partnership" through-
out and substituting the word" corporation, " this species of Hawai-
ian "corporation" would not be regarded as a "corporation" for
federal income tax purposes.
If therefore the state law label is not sacrosanct, the first step in
classifying a business organization for federal income tax purposes
is to ascertain its legal consequences under state law. This is the
method by which we have long determined whether or not an unin-
corporated group is to be treated as an "association" and hence as a
"corporation," and there is no reason to flinch from employing the
same process in deciding how a new-style professional corporation
shall be taxed. In this connection, I should note that this route is not
a one-way street. If the history of tax litigation teaches us anything,
it demonstrates that whatever position the Government may adopt
today, by tomorrow some taxpayers will argue that professional
corporations are not federal income tax" corporations," so as to
justify, for example, a deduction for business losses on their individ-
ual returns. Unless these taxpayers are estopped by the label they
adopt, they will unquestionably invoke the criteria that are embod-
ied in the Regulations under section 7701(a)(3) to estahlish that
professional corporations are "really" partnerships.
It is arguable, of course, that the Regulations under section
7701(a)(3) have no applicability to the professional corporation
because they are expressly concerned with the proper classification
of" unincorporated" groups. This argument is tinged with question-
begging, since it implies that the state label" corporation" llullifies
the applicability of the Regulations. Even if we accept the inap-
4~ Occasionally, of course, Il. corporation is disregarded as Il." dummy" or /I sham."
411 See note 5 8Upra.
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plicability of the Regulations, however, it does not follow that the
criteria it employs for classifying business organizations are irrele-
vant. Indeed, if the Regulations under section 7701 did not exist, we
should probably have to invent something like them. "'hat I am
suggesting, in short, is that the principles of the Regulations
afford as good a guide as we are likely to find for determining when
a self-styled "corporation': should be treated as such.
In applying these principles to the professional corporation, I feel
that most of the remarks and questions in my discussion of the
Georgia Professional Association Act are relevant.
Clauses in the professional corporation laws preserving the
"professional relationship" detract, as in the case of the Georgia
professional association, from the limited liability ostensibl)' en-
joyed by the shareholders and serve also to weaken the corpora-
tion's centralized management. All of the statutes under review
provide that shares of the professional corporation may be issued
and transferred only to persons who are duly licensed to practice
the profession, but with variations in the remedies and penalties for
non-compliance. In Florida, non-compliance is a ground for "dis-
solution" of the corporation; in Wisconsin it warrants" suspension
or forfeiture of [the corporation's] franchise." Arkansas, Minne-
sota, and South Dakota, whose statutes authorize only medical cor-
porations, provide that the corporation's certificate of registration
may be revoked by the state medical board after a hearing and
possibly subject to judicial review. But it is not clear whether
revocation of the certificate upon the disqualification of a share-
holder is mandatory or only discretionary. Oklahoma and Tennessee
fail to provide any specific remedy for non-compliance, presumably
relegating this matter to the statutory or common law governing
violations of the state's general corporation law.
Although the professional corporation statutes probably need not
have explicitly authorized the corporation or its shareholders to
require stock to be offered to them before a sale to outsiders, all,
except Tennessee and Wisconsin, regulate this matter to some ex-
tent. The Flo!-"ida statute goes further, requiring any sale or transfer
of shares to be approved by at least a majority of the other shares
at a special stockholders' meeting, a restriction that negates the
claim that the shares are freely transferable. Like the Georgia Pro-
fessional Association Act, most of the professional corporation stat-
utes provide that the shares of a disqualified shareholder shall be
repurchased at book value, but permit the charter or by-laws to
adopt a different valuation formula.
Little is said in the professional corporation statutes about cen-
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tralization of management, no doubt because the provisions of the
general corporation law governing this area were thought to be
satisfactory without modification. I have already discussed the pos-
sibility that the relationship between the professional and his client
or patient is inconsistent with" centralized management" because
of the professional's continued independence in both his contractual
and his non-contractual relationships with the patient or client, his
control over the professional records, his professional responsibility
with respect to fees, etc.
In my opinion, the professional corporation statutes are no more
efficacious than the professional association statutes in achieving the
federal income tax status of" corporation."
How SHOULD DOUBTS BE RESOLVED Y
In arguing that professional associations and corporations (1961
model) should not be classified as "corporations" within the mean-
ing of section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, I have
relied thus far upon their private law consequences under state
law. In the course of making an ultimate judgment, there is no
escape from a series of subordinate judgments about the meaning
of the state statutes; and there obviously is room for a difference
of opinion on a number of these preliminary issues. Even if a con-
trary resolution of some of these issues should bring the professional
association or corporation to the borderline between partnership
and corporation, however, it seems to me that there are a number of
good reasons why doubts should be resolved by denying corporate
status.
A. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE JURISDICTION
The appropriate manner of applying the federal income tax to
professional persons is a basic policy decision, involving compari-
sons between earned income and investment income, the weight to
be accorded to the legal form in which business is conducted, the
extent and importance of "bunching" of professional income, the
significance of self-employment, the demands of the revenue, etc.
The states do not pretend to, and cannot, weigh these competing
claims; that is a federal responsibility.
It is inevitable, of course, that the states in the course of regu-
lating personal and business behavior will affect the federal income
tax burden of their citizens: a state inheritance tax has a different
federal tax result from a state income tax; community property is
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taxed differently from common law property; the taxation of income
from property held in joint tenancy deptmds upon the rights of
the parties under state law; state law on the obligation of support
controls the taxation of certain trust income; etc.
But most rules of state law are formulated with little or no
thought of their federal tax results. There are exceptions, of course,
in which state legislation has been enacted for the primar)' or sole
purpose of gaining some federal tax advantage. One example is a
recent Connecticut statute providing that the widow's right to an
allowance for support during administration of her husband's es-
tate shall not be divested by her death;n The obvious legislative pur-
pose was to insure that the allowance would qualif)T for the federal
marital deduction. Other instances could be cited. But even though
some provisions of state law have as their sole purpose a change in
federal tax liability, they are ordinarily not without other substan-
tive consequences, and the effect on the federal exchequer of such
changes is almost always minor.
By contrast, the statutes permitting the organization of profes-
sional associations and corporations have no apparent purpose
other than federal tax reduction, they alter the non-tax results of
professional practice in only minimum degree, and they would have,
if successful, a substantial effect on the federal revenue. I can think
of no compar~ble outburst of state legislation in a half century of
federal income taxation other than the community property episode
described at the commencement of this article, and even this one,
despite the primary purpose of reducing the federal income tax
liability of married couples, would have produced private law con-
sequences of enough importance, especially in the case of broken
marriages, to be defended as an exercise of traditional state juris-
diction over domestic relations. Much less can be said for state
enactment of the legislature here under review, which aspires to
inflict heavy casualties on the federal Treasury while leaving the
state's non-tax lawvirtually unscathed.
Itmay be argued in reply that it is the states that prevented physi-
cians and attorneys from practicing in corporate form and thus ob-
taining the federal tax advantages of corporations, and that the
~7 Pub. Act No. 370, amending CONN. GEl'. STAT. § 45-250, 1961 Co:;::. LEGlli. SEn\·. 539.
Occasionally a mere change in the label affixed by a state to an e\"cnt or trrUiEaction is cl1ica-
cious in altering its federal income tax result, but these instancl!!! arc tri\"inl both in them-
selves and in the aggregate. See, for example, Re\". Rul 51-50, 1951-1 Cu:!. DuLL. 55, ai-
lomng the consumer to deduct an Oklahoma cigarette t= after the state changed ita law to
provide that the" impact" of the tax was"on" tIle consumer, although tho tax WM col-
lected from wholesalers.
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states do not infringe any federal prerogative if they repeal these
prohibitions, even if they do so primarily or solely to reduce the
federal tax liability of the affected taxpayers. I am prepared to
grant that if a state were to repeal the statutory, common law, or
administrative rules that have forbidden corporations to practice
the professions, its physicians and attorneys could organize corpo-
rations that would qualify as such under section 7701 (a) (3), and if
Congress objected, it would have to move affirmatively to deny that
status to corporations engaged in professional practice. But the
state legislation under review, instead of taking this course, com·
bines the award of a label with a bit of nibbling away at the fringes
of partnership law, and I see no reason to encourage such schemes
for indirectly amending the Internal Revenue Code.
B. RECENT FEDERAL TAX HISTORY
It cannot be claimed that state intervention in this area has be-
come necessary because of the failure of Congress to consider the
claim of professional groups that they are being unfairly denied the
tax advantages of corporations. Nor can doubts in interpreting
section 7701(a)(3) be resolved by assuming that Congress would
wish to give them corporate status. To the contrary, these claims
have been vociferously brought to the attention of Congress, and
Congress has demonstrated that it is in no hurry to accede to them.
This was the message of Congressional action in 1954, when sec-
tion 1361 was enacted to permit unincorporated business enterprises
to elect to be taxed as corporations. The stated purpose of this
provision was to permit" the business to select the form or organiza-
tion which is most suitable to its operations without being influenced
by Federal income-tax considerations." 48 If businesses that would
find it inconvenient to use the corporate form were to be allowed to
elect to be so taxed, one would have thought that the option would
be thrown open, a fortiori, to physicians and others who could not
organize corporations even if they wished to do so. But Congress
deliberately confined the election to enterprises in which" capital is
a material income-producing factor" or which are engaged in cer-
tain types of trading activities, with the result, as the Senate Finance
Committee pointed out, that" firms engaged in professional services
such as the law, accounting, medicine, engineering, and others"
are excluded from section 1361.49
Even if this limitation on section 1361, enacted with knowledge of
48 H.B. 8300, a.REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1954).
491bid.
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state hostility to corporate practice of the professions, IS not an
affirmative Congressional declaration that profC'ssional groups
should be taxed as proprietorships and partnerships, it certainl)' is
not hospitable to a relaxation of the standards under section 7701
(a) (3) to permit such groups to claim the status of "corporations. "
A similar lesson may be found in the history of Congressional ac-
tion on the Jenkins-Keogh bill and related pro}losalti to permit self-
employed persons to establish qualified pension plans.tiO The keynote
of the proponents of such legislation has been "equalit)~" between
employees and the self-emplo~'ed,and their principal focus has in-
disputably been the professions that may not be practiced in corpo-
rate form. I need not remind readers of this Re\'iew of the time
and thought, to say nothing of oratory, that haye bcC'u tl('\'oted to
this "quest for ta..'\:: equality" til or of the knot1~' problems that arise
in the effort to apply the abstract concept of elluit)' to the concrete
issue of retirement benefits. These problems would multipl)~, not
diminish, if some of the principal groups who would be affectl:'d b)'
the proposed Congressional legislation should obtain in soml:' states
the right to be taxed as corporations by utilizing a new form of busi-
ness organization. Until now the disparity that Congress has been
attacking arose from the fact that most professional persons arc
forbidden to incorporate, while most busincRs firms have a choice,
and it has been thought that even if this disparity cannot he elim-
inated,52 its reduction will alleviate the problem and will at lC'ast
leave all professionals in the same boat. The nl'W clement introduced
by this rash of state legislation is that some practitioners in some
states may now organize professional associntions nnd corporations
which, if recognized as "corporations" under seC'tion 7701 (a)(3),
will confer tax-savings on them that nrc deniccl to other professional
persons.
A distinction that is tolerable if it separates lawycrs from televi-
sion repairmen may be intolerable if it sepnratC's New Jcrsey law-
50 The history of these proposals ma)' be fouml in Rapp, Tlte Q/li'st {or Till: Equality {or
Pri1;afe Pen.~ion Plans: .tf. STtort History o{ tTte J enkins·lt'-0flll lllll, l4 TAX L. Rc\·. liS
(1958), brougllt up to date by the same author ill Rallll, 1'(//~if)/l~ {or tile SII{·Elllployed:
The Treasury Department·Finance Comlllittee Plan, 10 T.-\..'i: L. UC\'. :!27 (1001). Sec also
Hearings Before Senate Finance Committee all H.ll. IO, 8ith Cong., lilt SCES. (1901), and
a sequel reported in P·H BULL., Aug. 31, 1961, 4 P·Il ~ 32,411 (19l.il).
51 Rapp, supra note 50.
52 Whatever form a self-employed pension law may takc, it is nlmost certain to leave
a residue of tax distinctions between self-cmplo.}"cd persons amI owner·manngerl! of smnJl
corporations. Though not to be encouraged, such residual dbtinctions mn~' be excuBcd 00
the ground that lawyers and doctors are not, nfter nIl, interchnngcnblc with the ownero
of machine shops aud grocery stores, and that fireside ('cluit)· is sufficient.
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yers from Pennsylvania lawyers j and such a change in our threshold
of tolerance for inequality would require a far more refined self-
employment pension law.53 I do not mean to suggest that this would
be a bad thing or that the protracted study by Congress and the
Treasury of the tax status of professional persons constitutes nn
investment in research and development that must be protected
against expropriation by the state legislatures. I do think, however,
that state legislation designed to outflank Congress and the Treas-
ury ought not to be encouraged, especially when it is directed at a
problem under active Congressional study and has so meager a
non-tax content as to be virtually devoid of business purpose. I might
add that the state legislation would by no means eliminate the prob-
lem which the self-employed pension bills seek to solve: some states
have no such legislation; not all professions are covered j non-pro-
fessional self-employed persons who cannot effectively incorporate,
e.g., commission salesmen, are omitted; individual practitioners are
often excluded j and the taxpayer's choice of business form would
continue to control his federal tax liability.
C. THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
The state legislation under review has created a new species, pos-
sibly several new species, of business organizations, but we have
been given only the sketchiest of guides to their behavior. Authorita-
tive answers to the questions I have raised, and to others that are
bound to reveal themselves, can come only from the state courts, and
only as experience sharpens the issues and presents them for judi-
cial resolution. The Treasury will no doubt be asked to rule that
these organizations are taxable as "corporations," if requests for
rulings are not already pending. A favorable ruling presupposes
that the Treasury can decide with reasonable assurance the scope of
the shareholders' personal liability, the effect of the professional
relationship on the purported centralization of management, the
impact of disqualification, bankruptcy, and other events on the trans-
ferability of the shares and the continuity of the group, and a host
of other state law questions to which the answers are obscure and
may vary from one state to another.
DS It is, of course, possible that federal recognition of professional corporations and
associations would take some of the steam out of the Jenkins·Keogh movement, thus
stranding those professionals whose geographical location, profession, or other circum·
stances make professional incorporation impossible. Bee the question of Senator Anderson
in the Hearings on H.E. 10: "My point is, why do we have to havo H.R. 10 pluB this
[state professional corporation laws] Y11 Hearings, oupra note 50, at 154.
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I intend no disparagement of the legal skill of the Treasury's law-
yers in urging that they are not the proper persons to work out a
corpus of private law govel'lling the internal and external affairs
of these novel organizations, in an ex parte procedure that camlot
insure that all of the proper questions will be asked, let alone be
adequately argued. It is, of course, true that the Treasury must
often make preliminary decisions about the private law effect of
a contract, statute, or other legal event in order to rule 011 its federal
tax consequences, and I suggest no change in this practice. "What
I am saying, simply, is that the magnitude and novelt)' of the issues
to be determined deserve attention; here they seem to me to militate
against Treasury action at this time. Advisory opinions by the
Treasury, whether embodied in the Regulations, in ta.xpayers' rul-
ing letters, or elsewhere, are a discretionary function, and there are
times when delay is an appropriate administrative response to
requests for advice. This is especially so whelf litigation is inevita-
ble, so that the Treasury will not have the final word, as it docs in
practice, though not in theory, in the corporate readjustment area
(where a refusal to issue rulings ofteIl induces paral.}'sis in our cap-
tains of industry), and when the tux issue is entwined with state law,
so that the Treasury's views are likely to carr)' little weight with
the courts because of a palpable absence of the administrative ex-
pertise that, rightly or wrongly, is thought to inform its action in
other areas.
Sooner or later, of course, the Internal Revenue Service will have
to issue instructions to its agents, but by the time this becomes neces-
sary there may be a body of state decisions answering some of these
questions and affording a basis for extrapolating answers to others.
If not, the Treasury would do well, in m.}' opinion, to follow the
approach of its Regulations under section 7iOl(a) (3), which, by
stating that an unincorporated organization is to be classified as an
"association" only if it possesses more corporate characteristics
than non-corporate characteristics, resolves borderline or equipon-
derant cases by den)·ing corporate status.
As to the federal courts, if income tax disputes must be decided
before authoritative state court guides to the private law attributes
of the professional association or corporation are available, they too
might well be reluctant to develop a corpus of private luw in the
absence of such vitally affected parties as patients, clients, and pro-
fessionallicensing boards. :Moreover, they may be spared this ardu-
ous duty by the inability of taxpayers, who have the burden of proof,
to establish that the professional association or corporation has the
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necessary corporate attributes if the only evidence is the naked
language of the state statute.
D. A CLOUD ON THE HORIZON: THE" PROLETARIAN CORPORATION"
Recognition of professional associations and corporations would
pave the way to enactment of similar legislation for a much larger
group of persons who are not now covered by qualified pension and
profit-sharing plans, viz., employees whose employers have not seen
fit to establish such plans or who do not meet their employer's pre-
requisites for eligibility. It is often forgotten that only about 26
million members of a labor force of about 70 million are covered by
existing plans, and that many of those who are covered will receive
inconsequential benefits because their employers are contributing
less than the maximum amount legally deductible and because the
postponement of vesting results in many forfeitures.
Recognizing these facts, some of t,he predecessors of the J enkins-
Keogh bill were not restricted to self-employed persons, but also
embraced employees who were not covered or were inadequately
covered by plans established by their employers. But if state action
turns the trick for lawyers and doctors, why not state legislation to
allow everyone to "incorporate"~ 54 Without wishing to draft a
model statute, I can envision state legislation permitting any em-
ployee to organize his own corporation to furnish whatever services
his training, experience, or inclination suit him to perform, the
corporation being empowered to contract with any person or firm to
supply the services of its sole shareholder. The legislation would
preserve the pre-existing employer-emploree relationship in order
to carry forward all social legislation enacted for the benefit of
employees, and the newly-authorized "proletarian corporations"
would be empowered, notwithstanding the antitrust laws, to organ-
ize into unions to carryon collective bargaining. In all other re-
spects, the corporations would have, or would purport to have, the
"corporate characteristics" of limited liability, continuity of life,
centralized management, and transferability of shares.
I do not want to expand this article to comment on the proper
treatment of the "proletarian corporation," but I should like to
predict that we will soon be holding tax institutes on this subject if
the professional corporation is recognized for federal tax purposes.
It behooves us, therefore, to approach the professional corporation
54 For an analogy, see Blum, How to Get All (but all) tile Tax Advantages of Dabbling
in Oil, 31 TAXES 343 (1953), suggesting that perccntage depIction be extended to all
income.
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with a lively recognition of the fact that doctors and la"'J"crs are not
the only persons who are not covered by qualified pension and profit-
sharing plans:;;; and who cannot help themseh"es by incorporating
under general corporation laws.
55 I have empllasized the lure of qualified pension nnd profit-sharing plans, but employees
would probably not be repelled by deferred compensation plans, e:-;cllldiblc sick par and
death benefits, income-splitting, :Iud other opportunities that lire op"u to the limn with a
corporation.
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APPENDIX
[Vol. 17:
THE GEORGIA PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION ACT
Section 1. This Act may be cited as" The Georgia Professional Association
Aet."
Section 2. Definitions.
(a) "Professional Service" means any type of professional service which
may be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a State Examining
"Board pursuant to the provisions of Ga. Code Title 84, for example, tho
personal services rendered by attorneys at law, certified public accountants,
chiropractors, dentists, osteopaths, physicians and surgeons, and podiatrists
(chiropodists) .
(b) "Professional Association" means an unincorporated association, as
distinguished from a partnership, organized under this Act for the purpose
of rendering one type of professional service.
Section 3. Any two or more persons duly licensed to practice a profession
under the laws of this State may form a professional association, as distin-
guished from a partnership and a corporation, by associating themselves for
the purpose of carrying on a profession and dividing the gains therefrom
upon compliance with the terms of this Act; provided that no professional
association organized pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall render
professional service in more than one type of professional service.
Section 4. Such persons may form a professional association by executing
and recording Articles of Association in the Office of the Clerk of the Superior
Court in the county in which the association's principal office is lorated. The
Clerk shall record such Articles of Association and any amendments thereto
or instruments of dissolution thereof in a separate book to be kept for that
purpose, and shall receive as fees for recording any original Articles of Asso·
ciation or amendments thereto the sum of Five Dollars ($:>.00) plus Fifteen
Cents (15¢) for each one hundred words contained in the particular docu-
ment recorded. Such Articles of Association shall not be required to be pub.
lished or recorded elsewhere. Such record of said Articles of Association,
when so recorded, shall be notice of the provisions of the Articles to the world
as well as to all parties dealing with such Association. Such persons shall
adopt such name for the Association as they in their discretion may deter-
mine. Provided, that the name selected shall be followed by the words' CPro-
fessional Association" or the abbreviation" P .A." Said Articles of Associa·
tion may contain any provision not in violation of law or the public policy of
this State as the members of the association may decide. Such Articles may
be amended or dissolved at any time and from time to time by agreement of
two-thirds of the members at any regular meeting or at a special meeting
called for that purpose, and upon likewise recording such amendment or
instrument of dissolution in the same place or places as the original Articles
of Association.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 17 Tax L. Rev. 37 1961-1962
1961] PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS AND FEDERAL INCOME TA."UTION 37
Section 5. A professional association may be organized only for the pur-
pose of rendering one specific kind of professiol\al service and shall not en-
gage in any business other than rendering the professional set'vice for which
it was organized. However, it may invest its funds in real estate, mortgages,
stocks, bonds, or any other type of investment, and may own real or personal
property necessary or appropriate for rendering its professional service.
Section 6. A professional association may render professional service only
through officers, employees, and agents who are themselves dnly licensed or
otherwise legally authorized to render professional service within this State.
The term "employee" as used in this Section does not include clerics, book-
keepers, technicians, nurses, or other individuals who are not usually and
ordinarily considered by custom and practice to be rendering professional
services for which a license or other legal authorization is required in connec-
tion with the profession practiced by a particular professional association,
nor does the term" employee" include any other person who performs all his
employment under the direct supervision and control of an officer, agent, or
employee who is himself rendering professional service to the public 011 behalf
of the professional association; provided that, no person shall, under the
guise of employment, practice a profession unless duly licensed to praetice
that profession under the laws of this State.
Section 7. This Act does not modify any law applicable to the relationship
between a person furnishing professional service and a person receiving such
service, including liability arising out of such professional service, and in-
cluding the confidential relationship bctwerm the person rendering the pro-
fessional service and the person receiving such professional service, if any,
and all confidential relationships previously enjoyed under the laws of this
State or hereinafter enacted shall remain inviolate. Subject to the foregoing
provisions of this Section, the members or shareholders of any professional
association organized pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall not be
individually liable for the debts of, or claims against, the professional ns."iO-
ciation unless such member or shareholder has personan~· participated in
the transaction for which the debt or claim is made or out of which it arises.
Section 8. A professional association organized pursuant to the provisions
of this Act shall be governed by a Board of Governors elected by the members
or shareholders, and represented by officers elected by the Board of Goyer-
nors, so that centralization of management will be assured, and no member
shall have the power to bind the association within the scope of tIle' associa-
tion's business or profession merely by virtue of his being a member or share-
holder of the association. l\Iembers of the Board of Governors nced not be
members or shareholders of the professional association and officers need not
be members of the Board of Governors except that the President shall be a
member of the Board of Governors, provided that no officer or member of the
Board of Governors who is not duly licensed to practice the profession for
which the professional association was organized shall participate in any
decisions constituting the practice of said profession. The members may adopt
such by-laws as they may deem proper, or the power to promulgate by-laws
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of the association may be delegated by the Articles of Association to the
Board of Governors of the professional association, as the members or share·
holders may decide. Each member or shareholder shall have such power to
cast such vote or votes at the meeting of the members or shareholders as the
Articles of Association shall provide. The officers of the professional associa-
tion may employ such agents or employees of the association as they may
deem advisable subject to the provisions of Section 6 above. The officers of
the association shall include a President, Vice President, Secretary, Treas-
urer, and such other officers as the Board of Governors may determine. Any
one person may serve in more than one office provided that the President and
the Secretary of the professional association shall not be the same person.
Section 9. Unless the Articles of Association expressly provide otherwiso,
a professional association shall continue as a separate entity independent of
its members or shareholders, for all purposes for such period of time as
provided in the Articles, or until dissolved by a vote of two-thirds of the
members, and shall continue notwithstanding the death, insanity, incom-
petency, conviction for felony, resignation, withdrawal, transfer of member-
ship or ownership of shares, retirement, or expulsion of anyone or more of
the members or shareholders, the admission of or transfer of membership or
shares to any new member or members or shareholder or shareholders, or tho
happening of any other event, which under the law 01 this State and under
like circumstances, would work a dissolution of a partnership, it being tho
aim and intention of this Section that such professional association shall havo
continuity of life independent of the life or status of its members or share-
holders. No member or shareholder of a professional association shall have
the power to dissolve the association by his independent act of any kind.
Section 10. A professional association organized pursuant to the provi.
sions of this Act may issue stock or certificates of evidence of ownorship of
an interest in the assets of the professional association to the members of a
stock-type association, or the association may be a non-stock organization with
the members owning no individual interest in the assets of the association but
with the rights and duties specified in the Articles of Association, or tho
association may be a non-stock organization with the members owning undi·
vided interests in the assets of the association according to the Articles of
Association. The stock or certificates of ownership, if a stock.typo association,
or a membership in a non-stock association, shall be freely transferable except
as may be lawfully restricted in the Articles of Association. .A professional
association may issue its capital stock if it is a stock-type association or
accept as members of the professional association, if a non-stock association,
only persons who are duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render
the same professional service as that for which the profession!!l association
was organized. Subject to the provisions of the Articles of Association, the
estate of a member or shareholder who was a person duly licensed or otherwise
legally authorized to render the same professional service as that for which
the professional association was organized may continue to hold stock or
membership pursuant to the Articles of Association for a reasonable period
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of administration of the estate, but shall not be authorized to participate in
any decisions concerning the rendering of professional ser\'i~e.
Section 11. If any member, sharehold('r, agl'nt, 01' ('mplo)"ee of n profes-
sional association becomes legally disqualified to renl1('r a profl'ssionill service
within this State, or accepts employment or is elected to a publie office that
pursuant to existing law is a restriction or limitation upon rend('ring of pro-
fessional service, he shall sever all employment with, or financial intercst in,
such professional association forthwith. A professional association's failure
to comply or require compliance with this provision shall be a gl'ound for
the forfeiture of its right to render professional service as a professional asso-
ciation pnrsuant to the provisions of this Act, When a pro1't!ssional associa-
tion's failure to comply with this provision is brought to the attention of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall ct'rtify that fuet to the .Attor-
ney General for appropriate action to dissolve th(' prot'l'ssionlllu&'iodation,
Section 12. If the Articles of Association or by-law:> of a })l'ofcssional asso-
ciation fail to :fix a price at which a professionalussociution or its members
or shareholders may purchase the membership or shart's of a dt!eeased, re-
tired, expelled, or disqualified member or sharl'1lOlder, and if the Articles of
Association or by-laws do 110t otherwise provide, thN1 the price for such share
or shares or membership shall be the book value of such shal'e or shares or
membership at the end of the month immediately preccding th(' death of
or disqualification of the member or 8hareholdt'r. Book value shall be deter-
mined by an independent certified public accountant employed for such
purpose from the books and records of the professional association by the
regular method of accounting employed by the profes.'iiolllli al;socilltion. The
determination by the certified public accountant of book value shall be conclu-
sive on the professional association and its members or shareholdt!rs.
Section 13. A professional association shall, within 30 days ufter the or-
ganization of the professional association pursuant to the provisions of this
Act and within 30 days after the first day of !\ov('mber in each year there-
after, furnish a statement to the Secretary of State showing the numes and
post office addresses of all members or shareholders in such proft!ssional asso-
ciation and shall certify that all members or shareholders arc duly licensed
or otherwise legally authorized to render professional !>('l'Yice in this State.
This report shall be made on such form and shall be prest!ribel1 und furnishel1
by the Secretary of State, shall be signed by the Prt'sitIl'nt or Yice President
of the professional association, and aclmowledgt'd and sworn to before a no-
tary public by the person signing the report, and shull be filed in the office
of the Secretary of State, together with a filing fl.'e ill the amount of One
Dollar ($1.00). Upon the failure or refusal of any profc%iollal assorintion to
make said return or report to the Secretary of Btate, the proft:'s'iiollal associa·
tion shall be liable for a penalty of Fifty Dollurs ($30.00), and the Secretary
of State is authorized to iss.ue his ext'cutioll tl1('refor, indul1ing all costs
incurred.
Section 14. A member or shareholder of a professional association ma)'
sell or transfer his membership or shares in such professional association
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only to another individual who is duly licensed or otherwise legally author-
ized to render the same professional services as that for which the association
was organized.
Section 15. In the event of dissolution of a stock-type professional asso-
ciation, the Board of Governors, as trustees of the property of such profes-
sional association, shall apply the assets first to the payment of debts of the
association, and secondly, to the holders of the stock as provided in the
Articles of Association. In the event of dissolution of a non-stock type asso-
ciation, the assets shall be distributed, or sold, and the net proceeds distrib-
uted first to the payment of debts of the association, and secondly, to or among
the members of the association as the Articles of Association shall provide.
Section 16. A professional association organized pursuant to the provi-
sions of this Act may contract in its own name, take, hold, and sell real and
personal property in its own name, independent of its members, sue and be
sued as independent entities as now provided by law. Any conveJ'ance in tho
name of the professional association to a third person executed by tho Presi-
dent and attested by the Secretary shall be conclusively presumed to bo
properly executed and shall divest all right, title, and interest of the profes-
sional association, its members, and the Board of Governors thereof. Tho
assets of a professional association shall not be liable to attachment for the
individual debts of its members or shareholders.
Section 17. The law entitled "Actions by or against Unincorpornted
Organizations or Associations," approved February 13, 1959 (Ga. L. 1959,
pp. 44-46, and published in the Code of Ga. Ann. as Sections 3-117 to 3-121,
inclusive)" is incorporated herein by reference and shall govern such pro-
fessional associations organized pursuant to the provisions of this Act in
all respects as cor.tained therein.
Section 18. Such professional association organized pursuant to the pro-
visions of this Act shall be governed generally by all laws governing or
applicable to corporations, where applicable, and not in conflict herewith, and
no such association shall be held or deemed to be a partnership nor shall such
association be governed by laws relating to partnerships.
Section 19. Should any provision of this Act be held illegal or unconstitu-
tional, the same shall not vitiate the remaining provisions of this Act, but all
such provisions not held illegal or unconstitutional shall remain in full force
and effect.
Section 20. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are heroby
repealed.
.. These provisions permit suits by and against unincorporated associations to be brought
in the firm name. [Ed.]
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